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________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
 
PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
 
The Vacation Ownership Group (“VOG”) billed itself 
as a sort of advocacy group helping victims of timeshare fraud 
get out of their timeshare debts. After a lengthy and complex 
trial, a jury determined that VOG had in fact defrauded its 
customers, and that Adam Lacerda, Ian Resnick, and 
Genevieve Manzoni were each knowing participants in that 
fraud. In this consolidated appeal, they now challenge their 
judgments of conviction, raising several claims of error. For 
the reasons discussed below, we will affirm their respective 
convictions and sentences. 
I. Background 
A. VOG’s Fraudulent Activity 
A timeshare is a form of shared property ownership in 
which multiple people own the rights to use a specific vacation 
or resort property. These properties are often units in a resort 
condominium, in which each timeshare owner has an allotted 
period of time to use the property. When one buys a timeshare, 
he typically makes a down payment on the property and 
finances the balance of the purchase price. These loans are 
commonly referred to as “mortgages” in the timeshare 
industry. In addition to these upfront costs, timeshare owners 
are also required to pay annual maintenance fees. It is not 
unusual for timeshare owners to fall prey to high-pressure sales 
tactics and commit to spending more money than they can 
comfortably afford. Later, they may seek to settle these debts 
or cancel their timeshares.  
In 2009, while working for Wyndham Vacation Resorts, 
Inc. (a timeshare sales company), Adam Lacerda and his wife, 
Ashley Lacerda, founded VOG. VOG marketed itself as a 
timeshare consulting company and claimed that it could help 
customers cancel, purchase, or upgrade their timeshares. 
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Lacerda was the president and chief executive officer of VOG, 
and his wife was the chief operating officer. Together, they 
exclusively controlled VOG’s bank accounts and post office 
box.  
Lacerda created phone scripts for VOG’s sales 
representatives to use when speaking with timeshare owners. 
One of these scripts was VOG’s “bank settlement” pitch. This 
sales pitch was riddled with misrepresentations. Following this 
script, the VOG representatives used personal information 
compiled by VOG in “customer lead sheets” to make 
unsolicited calls to unsuspecting timeshare owners. The 
representatives said they were calling on behalf of a property 
owners’ association to follow up on the owner’s recent 
complaints. This was not true. The representatives also claimed 
they were working with the bank that held the loan for the 
owner’s timeshare mortgage. This was also not true. They then 
promised to review the owner’s account—which they could 
not do because they had no access to that account—and then to 
call the owner back. 
During a follow-up call, VOG representatives offered to 
settle the timeshare owner’s debt at a fraction of the remaining 
balance, for a negotiated fee. Later, during a closing call, the 
representatives had the timeshare owner electronically sign 
VOG’s contract and pay its fee. The representatives then 
promised that the “mortgage would be paid off in full” and the 
timeshare owner would receive a “deed free and clear.” But 
none of that happened. Instead, VOG just pocketed the money.  
Lacerda also trained his VOG employees to use a 
fraudulent phone script for a timeshare “cancellation” sales 
pitch. Again, VOG representatives made unsolicited calls to 
timeshare owners and falsely told them that VOG had received 
their complaints, that VOG would do all the necessary work to 
cancel the owners’ timeshares, and that cancellation would not 
damage the customers’ credit ratings.  
But VOG did not work to cancel the owners’ 
timeshares. Instead, after receiving the timeshare owners’ 
money, VOG sent them an eight-step process for cancelling the 
timeshares themselves and told them to stop making their loan 
payments. Eventually the timeshare owners received default 
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notices from the timeshare developers. When the owners 
complained to VOG, VOG instructed them to allow the 
developers to foreclose. Typically, this would lead to a 
nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding, which is common in the 
industry. This proceeding, Lacerda knew, would result in the 
cancellation of the owners’ timeshare debt, but at the cost of 
the timeshare deed, any equity the owners had, and, of course, 
the owners’ credit ratings.  
VOG employed additional misrepresentations: Lacerda 
impersonated bank officials on calls, altering his voice and 
using a spoofing device to alter his phone number. And VOG’s 
website falsely displayed the Better Business Bureau seal, 
advertising itself as an A+ rated business, and claimed to be a 
member of the American Resort Development Association.  
Not even the names used at VOG were true. Under 
Lacerda’s direction, VOG representatives used false names 
while interacting with potential customers. These false names 
allowed Lacerda and other former Wyndham employees to 
violate their non-compete agreements and hide their identity 
from former clients at Wyndham. This was important because 
VOG’s customer lead sheets were comprised almost 
exclusively of Wyndham timeshare owners.  
While employed by Wyndham, Ian Resnick sent 
customer lead sheets to VOG and received a kickback for every 
resulting sale. In August 2010, Resnick left Wyndham to join 
VOG full time. Using the bank settlement and timeshare 
cancellation scripts, Resnick defrauded several customers. 
Recognizing Resnick’s talents, Lacerda promoted him to 
Senior Contract Analyst. 
Genevieve Manzoni, another Wyndham-alumna, joined 
VOG in October 2010. As a VOG representative, Manzoni 
showed great initiative, inventing her own “settlement” 
numbers on the fly. She, too, assumed a management role, 
overseeing other VOG sales representatives.  
In November 2010, the FBI raided VOG’s offices and 
the Lacerdas’ home. Several VOG representatives left the 
company following the raid, including Resnick. So Lacerda 
convened an office-wide meeting where his lawyers, including 
 6 
Marc Neff, assured VOG staff that everything was okay. They 
told the employees that only Lacerda was under investigation, 
and that Neff had reviewed the sales scripts and verified that 
everything was legal. VOG abandoned the bank settlement 
pitch and revised the timeshare cancellation pitch to remove 
any references to working with the banks, while leaving many 
other misrepresentations in place. With these assurances and 
changes, many of VOG’s representatives, including Resnick, 
returned and VOG resumed and expanded its operations. 
Resnick continued receiving promotions, working as 
VOG’s Director of Training, then Director of Training and 
Compliance, and then Vice President of Sales and Compliance. 
While receiving compensation at VOG, Resnick and Manzoni 
also obtained unemployment benefits from New Jersey. 
B. Trial of VOG Defendants 
In April 2012, Lacerda, Resnick, Manzoni, and several 
other VOG employees were arrested after being charged with 
various counts of mail and wire fraud. VOG then changed its 
name to VO Financial and continued operations, still using the 
same misrepresentation-riddled sales pitches. Later, a 
superseding indictment was filed charging Lacerda, Resnick, 
Manzoni, and fifteen other VOG employees with conspiracy to 
commit mail and wire fraud. Lacerda was also charged with 
nine counts of mail fraud and three counts of wire fraud arising 
from his VOG scheme, and a final count of mail fraud for 
wrongfully receiving unemployment benefits while he was 
employed and receiving compensation at VOG.1 Resnick was 
charged with two counts of mail fraud and three of wire fraud 
for his work at VOG, and another count of mail fraud for his 
unemployment fraud. And Manzoni was charged with one 
count of wire fraud for her work at VOG and a separate count 
of wire fraud for, allegedly, wrongfully receiving 
unemployment benefits. Other VOG employees received 
similar charges. 
 
1 Lacerda, together with his wife, was also charged with 
conspiracy to commit money laundering and four counts of 
money laundering, but these were dismissed by order of the 
District Court as a matter of law. 
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Most of the VOG defendants negotiated plea 
agreements with the government. But five defendants—Adam 
and Ashley Lacerda, Resnick, Manzoni, and Joseph DiVenti—
took their cases to trial. Relevant to this appeal, about four and 
a half months before trial, the District Court disqualified 
Lacerda’s then-attorney, Neff, as a potential witness and 
denied replacement counsel’s requested continuance. It also 
denied Manzoni’s motion to sever her VOG-related fraud 
charges from her unemployment-related fraud charges.  
The government’s first witness at trial was FBI Special 
Agent John Mesisca, an experienced agent in wire and mail 
fraud investigations and the lead investigator in the case. 
Mesisca was allowed, over appellants’ objections, to provide 
an extensive overview of his investigation. During trial, again 
over appellants’ objections, the District Court also excluded 
certain hearsay evidence and allowed other evidence for 
impeachment purposes.  
The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts related to 
Lacerda. The District Court sentenced him to 324 months 
imprisonment with three years of supervised release, and it 
ordered him to pay restitution of $2,679,656.09. The jury also 
found Resnick guilty on all counts related to him. The District 
Court sentenced him to 216 months imprisonment with three 
years of supervised release and ordered him to pay restitution 
of $2,735,142.99. While the jury found Manzoni guilty of both 
the conspiracy charge and wire fraud in relation to her work at 
VOG, it acquitted her on the charge of unemployment fraud. 
The District Court entered judgment against Manzoni on the 
conspiracy and mail fraud charges, sentenced her to 42 months 
imprisonment with three years of supervised release, and 
ordered her to pay restitution of $105,422.2 The District Court 
also ordered the forfeiture of all of VOG’s gross proceeds. 
This appeal follows. The District Court had jurisdiction 
over the several crimes charged in this case under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231. We have jurisdiction over appeals from final 
judgments and orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
2 The jury also found Ashley Lacerda guilty on all 
remaining counts but acquitted Joseph DiVenti. 
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II. Overview Testimony 
A. Proper Overview Testimony Is Admissible 
Special Agent Mesisca’s testimony, including both 
cross and redirect examination, would extend into the third day 
of trial. On appeal, Lacerda, Resnick, and Manzoni each take 
issue with Mesisca’s testimony, arguing that it constituted 
impermissible overview testimony. We have never addressed 
the permissible scope and limits of overview testimony in a 
precedential opinion.  
Our sister circuits, however, have reviewed overview 
testimony. They have analogized it to summary testimony. See, 
e.g., United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 55–56 (D.C. Cir. 
2011). The main difference between summary and overview 
testimony is that summary testimony comes at the end of trial 
and overview at the beginning, but both try to connect the dots 
and convey the big picture to the jury in complex prosecutions. 
United States v. Banks, 884 F.3d 998, 1023 (10th Cir. 2018). 
Summary evidence may be safer because the evidence 
that the officer is connecting has already been heard by the 
jury. See Moore, 651 F.3d at 56 (citing United States v. Lemire, 
720 F.2d 1327, 1349, n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). Because 
witnesses can change their stories and objections may be 
sustained, some of the testimony relied on during the initial 
overview may never materialize at trial. United States v. Casas, 
356 F.3d 104, 119–20 (1st Cir. 2004). 
Vouching is also a problem with overview testimony. 
See Moore, 651 F.3d at 56–57. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 
608(a), a party can only bolster the credibility of a witness after 
that witness’s credibility has been attacked. Because overview 
testimony is the first testimony offered, no witness’s credibility 
has yet been attacked. Vouching for a witness who has not yet 
testified would, therefore, be inappropriate. 
Another serious problem with overview testimony is 
that it sometimes relies on anticipated witnesses. Thus, it may 
violate confrontation rights. Testimonial statements cannot be 
offered against a defendant without the opportunity for cross 
examination. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). If 
overview testimony previews the answers of an anticipated 
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witness, such a violation is not easily cured if the expected 
witness later fails to testify.  
The D.C. Circuit has explained: 
Because a witness presenting an overview of the 
government’s case-in-chief runs the serious risk 
of permitting the government to impermissibly 
“paint a picture of guilt before the evidence has 
been introduced,” and may never be introduced, 
we join the circuits that have addressed the issue 
in condemning the practice. 
Moore, 651 F.3d at 60 (citations omitted). 
The D.C. Circuit concluded that the government could 
call as its first witness a law enforcement officer, who is either 
familiar with the investigation or was personally involved, to 
explain how the investigation began, what law enforcement 
entities were involved, and what techniques were used. Id. at 
60–61. However, the overview witness could not opine on the 
ultimate issues of guilt, anticipate evidence that the 
government hoped to introduce, or express an opinion about 
the strength of that evidence or the credibility of any potential 
witnesses. Id. at 61; see also United States v. Rosado-Perez, 
605 F.3d 48, 55 (1st Cir. 2010) (cautioning, before government 
has presented supporting evidence, against presenting an 
overview of criminal investigation in which witness did not 
participate); United States v. Brooks, 736 F.3d 921, 930 (10th 
Cir. 2013) (allowing overview based on personal knowledge, 
not on hearsay nor on an opinion of defendant’s guilt); but see 
United States v. Khan, 794 F.3d 1288, 1300 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(overview proper where officer had personal knowledge of 
evidence due to officer’s role as lead investigator and his 
review of evidence). 
We join our sister circuits and now hold that overview 
testimony that opines on ultimate issues of guilt, makes 
assertions of fact outside of the officer’s personal knowledge, 
or delves into aspects of the investigation in which he did not 
participate is inadmissible. But an officer who is familiar with 
an investigation or was personally involved may tell the story 
of that investigation—how the investigation began, who was 
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involved, and what techniques were used. In addition, with 
proper foundation, he may offer lay opinion testimony and 
testify about matters within his personal knowledge. 
B. Summary of Special Agent Mesisca’s 
Overview Testimony 
Having determined the applicable rule, we now return 
to the appellants’ objections to Special Agent Mesisca’s 
overview testimony. Evidentiary objections are generally 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Georgiou, 
777 F.3d 125, 143 (3d Cir. 2015). This standard applies to the 
admission of overview testimony. See Rosado-Perez, 605 F.3d 
at 54 (citing Hall, 434 F.3d 42, 56–57 (1st Cir. 2006)). 
However, although district courts are “ordinarily afforded 
broad discretion to determine the manner in which evidence 
will be received,” in light of the pervasive risks of unfair 
prejudice, overview testimony requires closer review. Moore, 
651 F.3d at 58. Nevertheless, even if we find error in the 
admission of overview testimony, we can still affirm if the 
error was harmless. Rosado-Perez, 605 F.3d at 54. 
Applying our holding here, the District Court did not 
commit reversible error in admitting Mesisca’s testimony. 
Mesisca testified about his background, experience, and 
qualifications as the lead investigator in this case. He explained 
that the FBI had received a complaint about VOG from a 
timeshare developer, Flagship. Following a meeting with 
representatives of that company, Mesisca opened an 
investigation into VOG. He explained how he had subpoenaed 
VOG’s bank records and explained why certain checks were 
significant to his investigation.  
Mesisca interviewed potential victims, including people 
identified by Flagship and others whose names appeared on the 
checks. He also interviewed former VOG employees and 
conducted several undercover phone calls to obtain evidence 
from VOG. With this evidence, he applied for and obtained 
search warrants for VOG’s headquarters and the Lacerdas’ 
personal residence. 
The evidence, collected from Mesisca’s search, 
included purchase agreements, settlement and cancelation 
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contracts, emails and complaints from concerned victims, 
customer lead sheets, client information forms, and phone 
scripts used at VOG. His testimony provided the foundation 
for admitting this evidence as exhibits, and then, as with the 
bank records, he explained why the evidence was significant to 
his investigation.  
Mesisca testified that both Lacerda and his wife had 
control of VOG’s account. While the account received many 
deposits, no money from the account was used to pay off any 
timeshare debts. Instead, the Lacerdas used the money to buy 
a dog, a swimming pool, and similar things. 
Mesisca learned that some former Wyndham customers 
may have been victimized by VOG. One victim had received a 
phone call from “Robert Klein” representing VOG. Mesisca 
subpoenaed the caller’s phone records and discovered that the 
phone number was used by VOG, after incoming calls were 
forwarded to a local number in New Jersey. He also learned 
that “Robert Klein” was an alias for Lacerda.  
At the trial, Mesisca discussed the evidence he obtained 
through execution of the search warrant at VOG’s 
headquarters, laying the foundation for the admission of 
exhibits and explaining their importance to the investigation. 
He further explained the sales pitches used by VOG, based on 
the notes, emails, and phone scripts found at the office during 
the search, and illustrated many of the misrepresentations VOG 
representatives had made to victims.  
Mesisca obtained press releases issued by VOG and 
visited its website to collect more information and evidence. 
His testimony provided the foundation to enter this evidence as 
exhibits at trial. He also explained that, during his 
investigation, he met with informants who shared with him a 
video recording of a VOG employee training session. His 
testimony provided the foundation for entering this video 
recording into evidence. He was able to show, from his 
investigation, that Manzoni was working at and receiving 
income from VOG in October 2010, and Resnick was 
receiving income from VOG while collecting unemployment 
benefits in September and October 2010. 
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During the execution of the search warrant, Mesisca 
interviewed Lacerda. Lacerda advised him that he was the 
president and CEO of VOG and, contrary to the company’s 
sales pitches, that VOG was not associated with any bank, that 
it had no ability to pay off anyone’s mortgage or loan, and that 
it did not settle anyone’s debts. Lacerda acknowledged that his 
sales force used aliases but claimed that was only to induce 
outsiders to believe VOG was larger than it really was. Lacerda 
admitted that he used the VOG business account for personal 
expenses but claimed that he took only about $30,000. 
Mesisca’s investigation, showed that number was closer to 
$600,000. Lacerda admitted receiving unemployment benefits 
but claimed he had repaid those. Finally, Mesisca noted that, at 
the end of the interview, Lacerda refused to sign a statement 
that he had been truthful during the interview.  
Mesisca also interviewed Resnick who recounted that 
he worked as VOG’s premier closer: when other employees 
failed to complete a deal with a client, the information was sent 
to him to close it. A couple of weeks later, Mesisca again met 
with Resnick. During that second interview, Resnick 
acknowledged that he, too, had been a former Wyndham 
employee and that he took internal lead sheets from Wyndham 
and used them at VOG to call potential clients. Resnick 
admitted that he had collected unemployment benefits while 
working at VOG but claimed that he planned to repay the 
money. 
Mesisca interviewed Manzoni on three occasions. She 
admitted that VOG representatives told potential clients that 
the representatives worked with banks—it was part of the 
script they followed. During her August interview, she told 
Mesisca that, disillusioned with VOG, she had quit.  
We have set out Mesisca’s direct examination testimony 
to show that it was proper overview. It was limited to an 
account of his investigation, his personal observations, and his 
beliefs of what the evidence showed based on what he saw and 
heard and did. Also important is the testimony Mesisca did not 
offer. Because he was not directly involved in the execution of 
the warrant at the Lacerdas’ home, Mesisca did not tell the jury 
about that portion of the investigation. He only provided the 
foundation to admit evidence found at the Lacerdas’ house that 
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he had personally reviewed, and then related that evidence to 
bank records he had previously obtained While he noted that 
each of the defendants had been interviewed when the search 
warrant was executed at VOG, he did not discuss the 
statements made that day by Ashley Lacerda, DiVenti, or 
Manzoni because he did not personally conduct those 
interviews.  
C. Special Agent Mesisca’s Overview Testimony 
Was Admissible 
On appeal, Lacerda, Resnick, and Manzoni each 
highlight the length of Special Agent Mesisca’s testimony, as 
though that alone proves he gave impermissible overview 
testimony. Not so. This was a complex case in which, as lead 
investigator, he was directly involved in almost every step of 
the investigation. 
Lacerda and Manzoni each further assert that Mesisca 
offered conclusory statements of their guilt by referring to 
persons who the government alleged were defrauded by VOG 
as “victims.” The appellants have cited no authority, and we 
are aware of none, prohibiting government witnesses from 
referring to persons as “victims” who are alleged to be victims 
in the indictment. That there had been victims was not even 
disputed—it was highlighted by Lacerda and Resnick during 
their opening statements. Assertions to the contrary 
notwithstanding, whether there were victims was not at issue 
in this case. The issue was whether these defendants had 
defrauded the victims, or otherwise knowingly participated in 
the fraud occurring at VOG. The jury understood this and, 
finding insufficient evidence of guilt for one of the defendants, 
acquitted DiVenti.  
Lacerda also asserts that Mesisca gave conclusory 
testimony, without foundation. For example, he testified that 
“Robert Klein” was Lacerda’s alias. This issue was not 
preserved by any objection, see Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 51(b), and, 
having not attempted to show plain error, Lacerda is not 
entitled to review of this unpreserved issue on appeal. See 
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United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993).3 But even 
had this issue been preserved, there was in fact foundation for 
Mesisca’s testimony: he testified that, during their execution of 
the search warrant at VOG headquarters, agents had found a 
list of names with aliases at the receptionist’s desk. “Robert 
Klein” was listed as the alias for Lacerda, and Mesisca did not 
find evidence that anyone else ever used that alias.  
We have reviewed the appellants’ other allegations of 
improper overview, e.g., the reason for having duplicate copies 
of client information sheets, whether victims were told about 
non-judicial foreclosure process, whether Lacerda “freaked 
out” when he saw one of VOG’s representatives using the 
“bank pitch” in an email to a victim. etc. After careful review 
and consideration of the permissible limits of overview as set 
out above, we find no abuse of discretion in the admission of 
Mesisca’s testimony.  
In sum, the government may call as its first witness an 
officer who is familiar with, or was personally involved in, the 
criminal investigation, and that officer may testify about all 
matters within his personal knowledge from the investigation. 
Special Agent Mesisca’s testimony was largely confined to 
telling the story of his investigation: how it began, the steps he 
took, the evidence he uncovered, and the interviews with 
defendants he conducted. The District Court did not abuse its 
discretion by allowing this testimony. 
III. Objections Raised by Lacerda 
Lacerda raises several additional issues on appeal. He 
asserts that the District Court (1) abused its discretion when it 
disqualified his counsel, Marc Neff, based on Neff’s conflict 
of interest; (2) abused its discretion when it denied replacement 
counsel’s motion for a continuance; (3) abused its discretion 
by excluding from evidence an email sent by Lacerda to 
VOG’s former CFO, Jeff Sawyer; (4) abused its sentencing 
 
3 Lacerda takes issue with additional portions of 
Mesisca’s testimony unpreserved by timely objection but has 
not attempted to show plain error entitling him to review of 
these unpreserved issues. So we decline to address these 
unpreserved issues in this opinion. 
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discretion; and (5) erred by ordering the forfeiture of all VOG’s 
gross proceeds. We will address each issue in turn. 
A. Attorney Neff Was Properly Disqualified 
Lacerda argues that the District Court arbitrarily 
disqualified his counsel of choice or at least abused its 
discretion by disqualifying Neff. When a defendant challenges 
the District Court’s decision to disqualify his counsel of 
choice, we apply a bifurcated standard of review: first, we 
exercise plenary review when determining whether the District 
Court’s decision was arbitrary, and then, if not arbitrary, we 
review the decision for an abuse of discretion. United States v. 
Stewart, 185 F.3d 112, 120 (3d Cir. 1999). Here, we find that 
the District Court’s decision was neither arbitrary nor an abuse 
of discretion, so we will affirm.  
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees the right of counsel to every criminal defendant. 
That guarantee has generally been understood to encompass a 
right to the counsel of choice. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 
53 (1932). But the right to counsel of choice is not absolute. 
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988). “The essential 
aim of the [Sixth] Amendment is to guarantee an effective 
advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that 
a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom 
he prefers.” Id. at 159 (internal citations omitted). Before 
disqualifying a defendant’s counsel of choice, the trial court 
must balance that defendant’s right to his counsel of choice 
against the fair and proper administration of justice. United 
States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1074 (3d Cir. 1996). When 
“considerations of judicial administration supervene,” such as 
when an attorney has a serious potential conflict of interest, the 
presumption in favor of counsel of choice is rebutted and the 
right must give way. Id. at 1074–75 (citing Fuller v. Diesslin, 
868 F.2d 604, 607 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989)). 
Here, the District Court weighed Lacerda’s right to 
counsel of choice against Neff’s serious actual and potential 
conflicts of interest and, ultimately, determined those conflicts 
could neither be waived nor cured by anything short of 
disqualification. That conclusion was neither arbitrary nor an 
abuse of discretion.  
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After the FBI raid on VOG in November 2010, Lacerda 
retained Neff as his counsel. The following month, Neff met 
with VOG employees to ease any concerns they had, assuring 
them that (1) only the Lacerdas were under investigation by the 
FBI and (2) the post-raid revised phone scripts were lawful. 
VOG continued operations using the phone scripts whose 
legality had been vouched for by Neff. Contrary to Neff’s 
representations, 18 VOG employees, including the Lacerdas, 
were eventually indicted in this criminal case based in part on 
their use of the phone scripts. In proffers to the government, 
several of those defendants told of the December meeting with 
Neff. 
In United States v. Merlino, 349 F.3d 144, 151 (3d Cir. 
2003), we recognized that “[a]n attorney who faces criminal or 
disciplinary charges for his or her actions in a case will not be 
able to pursue the client’s interests free from concern for his or 
her own.” We also recognized the potential conflicts that arise 
when counsel realistically could be called as a witness, as “it is 
often impermissible for an attorney to be both an advocate and 
a witness.” Id. at 152. And we noted “that disqualification may 
also be appropriate where it is based solely on a lawyer’s 
personal knowledge of events likely to be presented at trial, 
even if the lawyer is unlikely to be called as a witness.” Id. 
(citing United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 933 (2d Cir. 
1993)). Each consideration applies here and was central to the 
District Court’s thorough and well-reasoned decision 
disqualifying Neff. 
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its 
Discretion in Managing the Trial Calendar 
After Neff was disqualified, Lacerda’s new counsel, 
Mark Cedrone, requested a lengthy continuance to prepare for 
trial. The District Court denied this request. Lacerda now 
challenges that denial on appeal. “We review the trial court’s 
refusal to grant a continuance for an abuse of discretion.” 
United States v. Olfano, 503 F.3d 240, 245 (3d Cir. 2007). 
Finding no abuse of the District Court’s discretion, we will 
affirm. 
“When presented with a motion for continuance, a court 
should consider the following factors: the efficient 
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administration of criminal justice, the accused’s rights, and the 
rights of other defendants whose trials may be delayed as a 
result of the continuance.” Olfano, 503 F.3d at 246. The 
District Court considered these factors and, given the time 
Cedrone had had to prepare Lacerda’s defense, denied the 
motion based on the government’s right to a speedy trial, 
efforts to streamline the case, the District Court’s calendar, and 
the need to “protect the rights of the parties in other cases.” 
App. 670:23–671:9. 
Lacerda now argues that the District Court abused its 
discretion and prejudiced his defense because, he claims, 
Cedrone had only four months to prepare for trial. But that is 
inaccurate. Cedrone entered his appearance on Lacerda’s 
behalf in November 2012—about eight months before jury 
selection began in July 2013—and Cedrone told the District 
Court in January 2013 that the scope of his representation was 
general and not limited to the disqualification motion. The 
District Court did not abuse its discretion. 
C. Lacerda’s 2010 Email to Sawyer Was 
Properly Excluded as Hearsay 
In its case-in-chief, the government presented evidence 
showing that Lacerda sometimes used the alias “Robert Klein” 
when contacting VOG customers. During the presentation of 
his defense, Lacerda testified that he was not the only person 
at VOG using that alias. On direct examination, he testified that 
he only began using the Robert Klein alias to respond to 
customer complaints that otherwise weren’t being addressed 
by other employees who would not admit having used the 
moniker. He further claimed that he did not use the alias before 
2010. The government used that assertion to impeach Lacerda, 
confronting him with a check made out to “Robert Klein” in 
2009, which he had deposited into his account. On redirect, 
Lacerda tried to enter a 2010 email he wrote to VOG’s former 
CFO, Jeff Sawyer, asking Sawyer to investigate who else was 
using the Robert Klein alias. But the District Court excluded 
the email as hearsay. 
Lacerda now challenges the District Court’s ruling on 
appeal. We review this evidentiary ruling for an abuse of 
discretion. United States v. Frazier, 469 F.3d 85, 87 (3d Cir. 
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2006). Finding no abuse of the District Court’s discretion, we 
will affirm. 
At the time of Lacerda’s trial, a witness’s prior 
consistent statement was admissible as non-hearsay only when 
the witness testified and was subject to cross-examination, and 
the out-of-court statement was offered to rebut a charge of 
recent fabrication or recent improper motive. See Fed. R. Evid. 
801(d)(1)(B) (2011).4 The Supreme Court had explained that 
the purpose of the exception was to rebut a charge of recent 
fabrication. Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 157–58 
(1995). “Prior consistent statements [could] not be admitted to 
counter all forms of impeachment or to bolster the witness 
merely because she has been discredited.” Id. at 157. 
In this case, the government did not accuse Lacerda of 
recently fabricating the claim that he began using the Robert 
Klein alias in 2010. Rather, it employed impeachment by 
contradiction: of course, Lacerda was using the Robert Klein 
alias before 2010; he profited from using the alias in 2009. 
Thus, under the former rules of evidence, Lacerda’s email to 
Sawyer was hearsay, and the District Court properly excluded 
it. 
D. Lacerda’s Sentence Was Procedurally Sound 
and Substantively Reasonable 
The District Court sentenced Lacerda to 324 months’ 
imprisonment for his leading role in VOG’s fraudulent 
enterprise. On appeal, Lacerda challenges his sentence as 
procedurally unsound and substantively unreasonable. Our 
standard of review on sentencing challenges is bifurcated. We 
“must first ensure that the district court committed no 
significant procedural error …. Assuming that the district 
court’s sentencing decision is procedurally sound, the appellate 
court should then consider the substantive reasonableness of 
the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” 
 
4 Though the Rule was broadly expanded in 2014 to 
allow for the use of prior consistent statements to rehabilitate 
the witness against other forms of impeachment, see Fed. R. 
Evid. 801(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2014), the former rule, with its 
limitation, applied in Lacerda’s case. 
 19 
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Applying these 
standards, we will affirm the District Court’s sentence. 
1. The District Court’s sentence was procedurally 
sound 
Lacerda argues that the District Court imposed a 
procedurally unreasonable sentence because, he alleges, it was 
based on a miscalculation of the number of victims of the VOG 
scheme and the total financial loss suffered by those victims. 
The government bears the initial burden of proving loss by a 
preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Ali, 508 F.3d 
136, 145 (3d Cir. 2007). The district court must then calculate 
the amount of loss associated with the crime of conviction and 
any relevant conduct that was “part of the same course of 
conduct or common scheme or plan.” United States v. Siddons, 
660 F.3d 699, 704 (3d Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). While 
this does not have to be an exact figure, it must be a reasonable 
estimate. Ali, 508 F.3d at 145. 
Lacerda first asserts that only those victims who 
testified during trial or whose victimization underlay a specific 
count of the indictment should have been counted as victims, 
claiming that including any other victims in the presentence 
investigative report (“PSR”) was based on “rank hearsay.” 
Appellant Lacerda’s Br. 62–64. Of course, a district court may 
rely on hearsay statements during sentencing, if “they bear 
some minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation.” 
United States v. Smith, 751 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(internal quotations and citation omitted). Victim statements 
are reliable when they “involve[ ] matters within the 
knowledge of each declarant and were made in the course of 
interviews by one or more law enforcement officials.” Id. 
In this case, for each victim identified in the PSR, the 
government submitted the following:  
(1) a declaration of victim losses, completed by 
the victims, executed under penalty of 
perjury, and submitted to the Probation 
Office; 
(2) an FD-302 summarizing an officer’s interview with 
the victim; and 
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(3) a canceled check verifying the amount the victim 
paid to VOG. 
That is more than mere allegation and enough under Smith to 
show reliability. The District Court’s calculation of victims 
was therefore reasonable. 
Lacerda next argues that the District Court’s calculation 
of loss was erroneous because it failed to offset the victims’ 
losses with credits for new timeshares and cancellation of prior 
debts. This argument is unavailing. The supposed cancellation 
of debt was one of the bases for the fraud charges. Cancellation 
was not achieved through VOG’s efforts, but through the 
victims’ credit-destroying defaults with the timeshare 
companies after those victims stopped paying their bills—
relying on VOG’s misrepresentations that their timeshare debts 
had been paid off. And the VOG victims were trying to get rid 
of their timeshares, not acquire new timeshares. Neither of 
these were “services” rendered by VOG; they were part of the 
fraudulent scheme. Perpetrators of fraudulent schemes are not 
entitled to credits against loss for payments made to perpetuate 
their schemes. See United States v. Hartstein, 500 F.3d 790, 
800 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[W]hen a defendant’s only subjective 
intent regarding repayments relates to this illegal purpose of 
perpetuating the scheme, a sentencing court may refuse to 
credit repayments against sums received from the victims.”); 
United States v. Whatley, 133 F.3d 601, 606 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(“[W]e are not inclined to allow the defendants a profit for 
defrauding people or a credit for money spent perpetuating a 
fraud.”); United States v. Blitz, 151 F.3d 1002, 1012 (9th Cir. 
1998) (same). 
2. The District Court’s sentence was substantively 
reasonable 
We will not reverse a sentence as substantively 
unreasonable “unless no reasonable sentencing court would 
have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant 
for the reasons the district court provided.” United States v. 
Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). Lacerda’s 
Guidelines range was calculated between 324 and 405 months. 
As demonstrated above, Lacerda has shown no error in that 
calculation. The District Court’s sentence of 324 months rests 
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at the very bottom of the range. When “the sentence is within 
the Guidelines range, the appellate court may, but is not 
required to, apply a presumption of reasonableness.” Gall, 552 
U.S. at 51. We will apply the presumption here.  
Lacerda presents a table of cases showing a range of 
sentences for other fraud cases and argues that his sentence, 
though at the bottom of his Guidelines range, is still “23 times 
greater than the median sentence for his type of offense.” 
Appellant Lacerda’s Br. 67–71. When a defendant seeks to 
argue disparate sentencing, he bears the “burden of 
demonstrating similarity by showing that other defendants’ 
circumstances exactly paralleled his, and a court should not 
consider sentences imposed on defendants in other cases in the 
absence of such a showing by a party.” United States v. 
Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150, 161 n.7 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing United 
States v. Vargas, 477 F.3d 94, 100 (3d Cir. 2007)) (internal 
brackets and quotations omitted). Lacerda has failed to 
demonstrate that any of the other defendants’ circumstances 
exactly paralleled his. So, “[a]ccording great deference” to the 
District Court—as the law requires, United States v. Lessner, 
498 F.3d 185, 204 (3d Cir. 2007)—we hold that Lacerda has 
failed to overcome the presumption that his sentence was 
reasonable. 
E. Forfeiture of VOG’s Proceeds Was Not 
Clearly Erroneous 
After finding that VOG was a wholly fraudulent 
scheme, the District Court ordered all its gross proceeds 
forfeited under 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(C) & 982(a)(8) and 
28 U.S.C. § 2461(c). Lacerda raises two challenges to the 
District Court’s forfeiture order on appeal. First, he asserts that 
he lacked sufficient notice that the government would seek 
forfeiture upon his conviction because the government cited 
the wrong criminal forfeiture statutes in its superseding 
indictment. Second, he asserts that the District Court’s finding 
that all VOG’s revenues were either directly or indirectly 
attributable to VOG’s fraud, and so subject to forfeiture, was 
clearly erroneous. Because forfeiture orders involve mixed 
questions of law and fact, our standard of review here is 
bifurcated. We review the District Court’s legal conclusions de 
novo and its findings of facts for clear error. See United States 
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v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 1124, 1165 (10th Cir. 2013). Applying 
this standard, we find no error by the District Court, and we 
will affirm. 
1. Lacerda had notice that, upon conviction, the 
government would seek forfeiture 
In its superseding indictment, the government gave 
notice that, upon conviction, it would seek forfeiture of “any 
property constituting or derived from proceeds obtained 
directly or indirectly as a result of such offenses” under 18 
U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(D) & 982(a)(2)(A) and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2461(c). App. 287. Lacerda notes, and the government 
concedes, that the cited criminal statutes are not the correct 
statutes for forfeiture of proceeds from mail and wire fraud 
involving telemarketing. The correct statute is 18 U.S.C. 
§ 982(a)(8), the statute under which the District Court ordered 
forfeiture. Lacerda first argues that the forfeiture order cannot 
be based on the civil forfeiture statute because, under our 
precedent in United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 
199 (3d Cir. 2006), forfeiture orders can be based on 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2461(c) only when “there is no specific statutory provision 
that permits criminal forfeiture.” Lacerda further argues that, 
by citing incorrect forfeiture statutes for his crimes, the 
government failed to provide the notice required by the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Lacerda is mistaken on both 
grounds. 
First, Lacerda’s reliance on Vampire Nation is 
misguided. Our Vampire Nation decision was based on the 
language of the prior version of 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c).5 Giving 
 
5 The applicable statute read: 
 
If a forfeiture of property is authorized in 
connection with a violation of an Act of 
Congress, and any person is charged in an 
indictment or information with such violation 
but no specific statutory provision is made for 
criminal forfeiture upon conviction, the 
government may include the forfeiture in the 
indictment or information in accordance with the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and upon 
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the words of that statute their plain meaning, we concluded that 
“criminal forfeiture is not permitted unless (1) a substantive 
provision exists for civil forfeiture of the criminal proceeds at 
issue; and (2) there is no specific statutory provision that 
permits criminal forfeiture of such proceeds.” Vampire Nation, 
451 F.3d at 199. In 2006, Congress amended the statute and 
eliminated the second requirement.6 The amendment to 
28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) effectively abrogates the portion of 
Vampire Nation upon which Lacerda now relies. Under the 
current version of the statute, the District Court correctly 
 
conviction, the court shall order the forfeiture of 
the property in accordance with the procedures 
set forth in section 413 of the Controlled 
Substances Act ( 21 U.S.C. 853), other than 
subsection (d) of that section. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 
6 The statute now reads: 
 
If a person is charged in a criminal case with a 
violation of an Act of Congress for which the 
civil or criminal forfeiture of property is 
authorized, the government may include notice 
of the forfeiture in the indictment or information 
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. If the defendant is convicted of the 
offense giving rise to the forfeiture, the court 
shall order the forfeiture of the property as part 
of the sentence in the criminal case pursuant to 
to [sic] the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
and section 3554 of title 18, United States Code. 
The procedures in section 413 of the Controlled 
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 853) apply to all 
stages of a criminal forfeiture proceeding, except 
that subsection (d) of such section applies only 
in cases in which the defendant is convicted of a 
violation of such Act. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) (2006). 
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ordered restitution, and Lacerda had notice under the civil 
statute.  
Second, the government provided Lacerda with 
sufficient notice under the criminal rules. Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 32.2 sets forth the notice requirement that 
must be met before forfeiture can be ordered by a district court. 
It states: 
A court must not enter a judgment of forfeiture 
in a criminal proceeding unless the indictment or 
information contains notice to the defendant that 
the government will seek the forfeiture of 
property as part of any sentence in accordance 
with the applicable statute. 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a). This rule does not require the level of 
specificity demanded by Lacerda. Rather, as we have held, “[a] 
conclusory forfeiture allegation in the indictment that 
recognizably tracks the language of the applicable criminal 
forfeiture statute” is sufficient under the rule. United States v. 
Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716, 719 (3d Cir. 1993). We recognize that 
Sarbello specifically addressed then-Rule 7(c)(2), which was 
removed with the 2009 amendments. But that rule was 
removed only because it had become obsolete: “In 2000 the 
same language was repeated in subdivision (a) of Rule 32.2, 
which was intended to consolidate the rules dealing with 
forfeiture.” See Fed. R. Crim. P. 7 note (2009 Amendment). 
We now hold, consistent with Sarbello, that general notice of 
forfeiture is sufficient under Rule 32.2. Thus, Lacerda had 
sufficient notice that the government would seek forfeiture 
upon his conviction. 
2. Based on its finding that VOG used its revenues to 
promote and facilitate its fraud, the District Court 
correctly ordered those revenues forfeited 
Lacerda next contends that the District Court erred by 
subjecting all VOG’s proceeds to forfeiture rather than limiting 
the order to the losses directly claimed by VOG’s victims. But 
the relevant statute is not so narrow. Rather, addressing the 
crimes committed by Lacerda at VOG, 18 U.S.C. § 982 
requires the court to  
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order that the defendant forfeit to the United 
States any real or personal property— 
(A) used or intended to be used to commit, to 
facilitate, or to promote the commission 
of such offense; and  
(B) constituting, derived from, or traceable to 
the gross proceeds that the defendant 
obtained directly or indirectly as a result 
of the offense. 
18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(8). The District Court found that VOG was 
a fraudulent enterprise from beginning to end, and that all its 
gross proceeds were used to further its fraud. Based on those 
findings, the District Court correctly ordered the forfeiture of 
all VOG’s proceeds. 
Lacerda does not appear to challenge the District 
Court’s findings on appeal. Instead, he argues that what it 
means for property to be “indirectly” derived, traceable, or 
obtained from an offense is ambiguous, so the rule of lenity 
should govern our interpretation of the forfeiture statute. We 
reject this argument. First, it is irrelevant. The District Court’s 
order focused on the fact that VOG had used all its revenues to 
promote and facilitate its fraud, not on whether those revenues 
were direct or indirect. Second, “[t]he rule of lenity … is 
inapplicable if there is only a mere suggestion of ambiguity 
because most statutes are ambiguous to some degree.” United 
States v. Cheeseman, 600 F.3d 270, 276 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(internal quotation omitted). Lacerda has failed to show that 
the forfeiture statute is ambiguous—much less sufficiently 
ambiguous—to warrant application of the rule of lenity. 
Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States 
explained that the purpose of forfeiture statutes is to separate 
the criminal from his ill-gotten gains, to return, in full, the 
property of defrauded victims, and to lessen the economic 
power of criminal enterprises. Honeycutt v. United States, 137 
S. Ct. 1626, 1631 (2017) (citing Caplin & Drysdale, Ctd. v. 
United States, 491 U.S. 617, 629–30 (1989)). The District 
Court’s forfeiture order here meets those purposes. The District 
Court found that VOG was a thoroughly corrupt criminal 
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conspiracy from beginning to end, and that its revenue was 
used to promote and facilitate its crimes. That finding is 
supported by substantial evidence and does not appear to be 
challenged by Lacerda on appeal. The District Court correctly 
ordered the forfeiture of all of VOG’s revenues. 
IV. Objections Raised by Resnick 
Like Lacerda, Resnick also raises several additional 
issues on appeal. He claims that (1) the government suppressed 
material evidence; (2) the District Court miscalculated the 
number of his victims and the loss amount for those victims, 
and so erred at sentencing; (3) his due process rights were 
violated when his sentencing hearing was delayed; and (4) the 
District Court’s restitution order was procedurally unsound and 
substantively unreasonable. We will address each argument in 
turn. 
A. The Government Did Not Commit a Brady 
Violation 
Resnick asserts that the government violated its 
obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by 
withholding evidence which he might have used to impeach 
Special Agent Mesisca. Specifically, Resnick claims that the 
government withheld the documents that were the basis of a 
victim’s, Dorothy Gerlach’s, FD-3027 and withheld Gerlach’s 
later-produced “Declaration of Victim’s Losses.” Resnick 
preserved this argument by raising it to the District Court in a 
motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. 
The District Court correctly denied that motion. 
Under Brady, the government has a duty to disclose 
“evidence that is favorable to the defense and material to the 
defendant’s guilt or punishment.” Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 
75 (2012). Thus, there are three prerequisites to a Brady 
violation: (1) the government must have failed to disclose 
evidence; (2) that evidence must have been favorable to the 
defendant; and (3) that evidence must have been material. 
 
7 The FD-302, commonly referred to simply as a “302”, 
is the form commonly used by FBI agents to summarize 
witnesses’ statements and interviews. 
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Evidence is “material” only if there is a reasonable probability 
that its disclosure would have led to a different outcome at trial, 
and so undermines confidence in the verdict. Turner v. United 
States, 137 S. Ct. 1885, 1893 (2017). The evidence Resnick 
claims was withheld fails to satisfy each of the three 
prerequisites. 
Contrary to Resnick’s assertions, the government did 
not withhold the evidence. The documents underlying 
Gerlach’s 302, labeled as “DG-3”, were disclosed before trial. 
The Declaration of Victim’s Losses, “DG-2”, was received by 
the probation office in May 2013, but not forwarded to the 
prosecutor until late in 2014. The prosecutor disclosed the 
declaration with other documents in January 2015. 
Resnick is correct that the failure to disclose 
information known only to police investigators can still 
implicate the prosecution, even when the prosecutor was 
unaware of the information. Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 
U.S. 867, 869–70 (2006). But probation officers in the federal 
system are not police investigators; they are “the court’s eyes 
and ears and provide information and recommendations to the 
court.” United States v. Amatel, 346 F.3d 278, 279 (2d Cir. 
2003). We will not impute to the prosecution the Probation 
Office’s failure in 2013 to disclose Gerlach’s “Declaration of 
Losses” to Resnick. 
But even if we did impute to the prosecution the 
Probation Office’s failure to disclose, it still would not 
constitute a Brady violation. Far from being material evidence 
that could have undermined Resnick’s conviction, this 
evidence reinforces the jury’s verdict. Resnick admitted that 
“he pitched a bank settlement deal to Ms. Gerlach.” App. 
7737:19–21. There were two parts to the bank settlement pitch: 
VOG promised to help the victims pay off their debt and keep 
their timeshare property, and then, in a bait and switch, sold 
them a second timeshare through VOG. Gerlach’s declaration, 
which expresses confusion over not receiving points she was 
promised, highlights that bait and switch. Thus, the declaration 
was not exculpatory; it was inculpatory. 
We conclude that the government did not violate its 
obligations under Brady.  
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B. The Timing of Resnick’s Sentencing Did Not 
Violate His Sixth Amendment or Due 
Process Rights 
Resnick next claims that his speedy sentencing rights 
were violated when his sentence was not imposed for more 
than two-and-a-half years following his conviction. We once 
recognized a right to a speedy sentencing hearing under both 
the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. See 
Burckett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208, 1219–21 (3d Cir. 
1987). But the Supreme Court of the United States has since 
clarified that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the 
right to a speedy trial, not a speedy sentencing. Betterman v. 
Montana, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1613 (2016). “That does not mean, 
however, that defendants lack any protection against undue 
delay at [sentencing].” Id. at 1617. Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 32(b)(1) requires courts to “impose sentence 
without unnecessary delay.” Id. And, the Supreme Court noted, 
the convicted defendant maintains his due process rights. Id. 
Thus, while Betterman overruled our speedy sentencing 
precedent under the Sixth Amendment, our precedent under the 
Due Process Clause survives. Under that precedent, we apply 
the same framework adopted by the Supreme Court in Barker 
v. Wingo, considering: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the 
reasons for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right; 
and (4) any prejudice suffered by the defendant. 407 U.S. 514, 
530 (1972). Consideration of these factors leads us to the 
conclusion that Resnick suffered no deprivation of his due 
process right to a speedy sentencing. 
First, the length of the delay between conviction and 
sentencing—more than two-and-a-half years—was 
substantial. This factor favors Resnick. 
But second, as the District Court found, three things 
contributed to the delay in getting to sentencing. (1) This was 
a very complex fraud scheme involving 18 separate 
defendants, and the deliberation necessary to address the 
scheme and its victims required time. (2) Resnick sought 
several continuances of his sentencing. The government, on the 
other hand, never requested a continuance. (3) The District 
Court delayed sentencing to research Resnick’s claims that 
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some of the purported victims were not really victims. So any 
unnecessary delays, if there were unnecessary delays, are 
mainly attributable to Resnick. None are attributable to the 
government. This factor weighs heavily against Resnick. 
Third, Resnick asserted his right to a speedy sentencing 
in a motion filed on March 3, 2016. Ironically, that motion also 
sought leave to serve a Rule 17(c) subpoena to obtain 
additional documents, which would have further delayed 
sentencing. (Id.) Resnick’s sentencing hearing took place on 
April 22, 2016, seven weeks after he filed his request. If this 
factor favors Resnick, it does so with little weight. 
Fourth and finally, Resnick asserts that the delays to his 
sentencing prejudiced him because the government was able to 
identify additional victims and adduce sufficient evidence to 
prove their losses by a preponderance of the evidence. We do 
not think this argument is well taken. Allowing the government 
time to identify additional victims did not affect his Sentencing 
Guidelines range. Resnick’s victim and loss total—whether 
calculated in 2014 under the initial PSR at 124 victims with 
$1.2 million in losses, or the government’s initial filing of 192 
victims with $2.1 million in losses, or in 2015 under the 
government’s revised filing of 253 victims with $2.7 million in 
losses—always yields a 16-level enhancement. Compare 
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2014), with U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) 
(2015). Thus, Resnick’s Guidelines range was unaffected, and 
he has failed to show prejudice. This factor also weighs heavily 
against Resnick. 
Taking the four factors together, we conclude that 
Resnick has failed to show that his due process right to a 
speedy sentence was violated.  
C. The District Court Correctly Applied the 
Sentencing Guidelines In Fashioning 
Resnick’s Sentence 
Resnick next challenges several of the District Court’s 
findings at sentencing. We “review factual findings relevant to 
the Guidelines for clear error and … exercise plenary review 
over a district court’s interpretation of the Guidelines.” United 
States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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First, Resnick claims that by adopting the government’s 
proposed timeline for VOG’s operations the District Court 
allowed the government to inflate its victim and loss figures. 
He argues that, because the government limited the timeframe 
for its evidence at trial, any victims found outside of that 
limited timeframe should not count. Of course, because the 
VOG-conspirators continued operations during their trial—
through 2014—some victims arose after the government’s 
limited timeframe. It was appropriate for those victims to be 
included. And we again note that the government’s calculation 
of victims’ losses did not affect Resnick’s ultimate Guidelines 
range.  
The Sentencing Guideline that applies to Resnick’s 
fraud is § 2B1.1, covering various forms of theft. Following 
the 2015 amendment, a six-level enhancement should be 
applied when the crime “resulted in substantial financial 
hardship to 25 or more victims.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C). 
That is the highest-level enhancement for number of victims. 
The definition of “substantial financial hardship” includes 
“suffering substantial harm to his or her ability to obtain 
credit.” See U.S.S.G. application notes § 4(F)(vi). As the credit 
ratings of all the victims of VOG were severely damaged by 
VOG’s schemes, Resnick began on the wrong side of that 
threshold. That the government ultimately identified more than 
250 victims was immaterial for the Guidelines calculation. 
And, as discussed in section IV(B), whether using the initial 
victim and loss estimates in 2014, or the more comprehensive 
totals following the 2015 amendment, Resnick’s victims’ loss 
total yields the same 16-level enhancement. 
Second, Resnick challenges the District Court’s finding 
that VOG was a fraudulent enterprise from beginning to end. 
Resnick argues that not all VOG’s employees knew that they 
were part of a fraudulent scheme, so there must have been some 
non-fraudulent work at VOG. This conclusion does not follow 
from Resnick’s premise because those employees’ alleged 
ignorance is not imputed to Resnick and his co-defendants. A 
conviction for mail or wire fraud requires both objective 
misrepresentations and the defendant’s subjective knowledge 
of the misrepresentations. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343. The 
jury found that Resnick knowingly participated in VOG’s 
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fraud, so the argument based on others’ alleged knowledge 
does not help him.  
Resnick also argues that the finding is inconsistent with 
the District Court’s willingness to consider his argument that 
not all VOG victims were equally victimized. The District 
Court noted that VOG had engaged in various types of fraud. 
That the Court recognized that some instances of VOG’s fraud 
were more flagrant than others does not undermine the District 
Court’s overall finding that VOG was a wholly fraudulent 
enterprise. Rather, having carefully reviewed this case, we 
conclude that the Court’s finding was supported by substantial 
evidence and will be affirmed. 
Third, like Lacerda, Resnick argues that services like 
debt cancellation and the sale of new timeshares should be 
credited against the victims’ losses. We addressed this 
argument in section III(D)(1), and our analysis applies equally 
to Resnick. Cancellation was achieved only because the 
victims defaulted on their loans, not because of some value-
adding intervention from VOG. The defaults impacted the 
victims’ credit ratings in significant and negative ways. The 
District Court was correct to not credit VOG’s alleged 
“services” against the losses suffered by Resnick’s victims. 
And like Lacerda, Resnick is not entitled to credit against his 
victim’s losses for payments VOG made to perpetuate its 
fraudulent schemes. See Hartstein, 500 F.3d at 800; Whatley, 
133 F.3d at 606; Blitz, 151 F.3d at 1012. 
Fourth and finally, Resnick argues that, under U.S.S.G. 
§ 2B1.1, refunded monies by third parties should be credited 
against his victim’s losses. The Guidelines provides that the 
victim’s loss “shall be reduced by … [t]he money returned … 
by the defendant or other persons acting jointly with the 
defendant, to the victim before the offense was detected.” 
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(3)(E)(i) (emphasis added). Resnick argues 
that he is entitled to credit for refunds to victims made by 
“escrow compan[ies] utilized to procure third party 
timeshares” and other “timeshare developers.” Appellant 
Resnick’s Br. 71. But there is no evidence that the escrow 
agents and timeshare developers were “acting jointly” with 
Resnick, or that the refunds were made “before the offense was 
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detected.” The District Court correctly denied any credits 
against Resnick’s victims’ losses. 
D. Resnick Forfeited His Objection to the 
District Court’s Restitution Order 
Because of the many complexities of this case, 
restitution was delayed until sometime after sentencing. While 
Resnick filed a timely notice of appeal from his judgment and 
sentence, he never appealed from the later-entered order of 
restitution. Resnick now raises various challenges to the 
District Court’s award of restitution entered against him under 
18 U.S.C. § 3663A. But the government contends that we must 
dismiss Resnick’s challenges because of his failure to file a 
separate notice of appeal from the restitution order. The 
government is correct. 
This issue raises a jurisdictional question, over which 
we exercise plenary review. Hamilton v. Bromley, 862 F.3d 
329, 333 (3d Cir. 2017). Resolution of this question is 
controlled by Manrique v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1266, 1274 
(2017), in which the Supreme Court held “that a defendant who 
wishes to appeal an order imposing restitution in a deferred 
restitution case must file a notice of appeal from that order.” 
Deferred restitution cases, the Supreme Court explained, 
involve two appealable judgments, not one. Id. at 1273; see 
also Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605, 616–18 (2010). 
Both the statute and rules governing appeals “contemplate that 
the defendant will file the notice of appeal after the district 
court has decided the issue sought to be appealed.” Manrique, 
137 S. Ct. at 1271 (emphasis original). So notices of appeal 
filed before the restitution order cannot be “for review” of the 
restitution order and are not filed timely from that order. Id. 
The Supreme Court held that filing a timely notice of appeal 
from an order of restitution was at least a mandatory claim-
processing rule, id. at 1272 (citing Greenlaw v. United States, 
554 U.S. 237, 252–53 (2008)), and when the government raises 
the failure to timely file the notice, our duty to dismiss the 
appeal is also mandatory, id. (citing Eberhart v. United States, 
546 U.S. 12, 15, 19 (2005)). 
Resnick did not file a timely notice of appeal from the 
order of restitution, and the government has raised this failure 
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on appeal. Thus, under Manrique, Resnick at least violated a 
mandatory claim-processing rule and we have a mandatory 
duty to dismiss this issue. 
V. Objections Raised by Manzoni 
In addition to Manzoni’s challenge to Special Agent 
Mesisca’s overview testimony, she also argues that (1) the 
District Court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecution 
to impeach a codefendant with an audio recording that 
implicated her; (2) the District Court erred when it joined the 
charges arising from her participation in the fraudulent 
activities at VOG and her charge of alleged unemployment 
fraud; and (3) there was insufficient evidence presented to the 
jury to sustain her fraud and conspiracy convictions. We will 
address each of these issues in turn. 
A. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its 
Discretion in Admitting Evidence of a Phone 
Call to a Victim 
During trial, it came to light that some defendants had 
engaged in witness tampering. The government sought to enter 
the recording of a phone call between one of the defense 
witnesses, Dennis Nadeau, and a victim, David Jasper, 
showing an attempt at such tampering. Manzoni objected to 
admission of the recording on two grounds. At first, she argued 
that it was unduly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 
403 because, though the evidence of tampering was not being 
offered against her, she was the subject of the victim’s 
complaint. But this was not apparent from the phone call itself; 
Manzoni was never actually named by the victim. So she also 
argued that the phone call should be excluded as hearsay. She 
presents these same arguments on appeal. 
1. The District Court did not abuse its discretion 
under Rule 403 
Manzoni asserts that the District Court abused its 
discretion under Rule 403 by allowing the recording of the 
phone call into evidence. “We generally review a district 
court’s evidentiary findings for abuse of discretion.” United 
States v. Bailey, 840 F.3d 99, 117–18 (3d Cir. 2016). Rule 403 
allows relevant evidence to be excluded when its probative 
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value is substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair 
prejudice. Id. at 117. When a district court conducts an on-the-
record weighing of probative value against unfair prejudice, its 
evidentiary decision is entitled to great deference. Id. “In order 
to justify reversal, a district court’s analysis and resulting 
conclusion must be arbitrary or irrational.” Id. 
In this case, the District Court conducted an on-the-
record Rule 403 analysis—both orally and in a later written 
order. The District Court found that the phone call’s “probative 
value as to the consciousness of guilt” outweighed any 
prejudice. App. 5015:3–5. But it also recognized that there 
could be some spillover effect for Manzoni, so it acted to 
mitigate that unfair prejudice by offering multiple curative 
instructions—including one drafted by Manzoni. The District 
Court’s analysis and its conclusion were neither arbitrary nor 
irrational. We therefore find no abuse of the District Court’s 
discretion under Rule 403, and we will uphold the District 
Court’s decision to allow the recording into evidence. 
2. Because the phone call was offered for a non-
hearsay purpose, it was not hearsay 
Manzoni next argues that the phone call was hearsay. 
“Whether a statement is hearsay is a legal question subject to 
plenary review.” United States v. Price, 458 F.3d 202, 205 (3d 
Cir. 2006). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c), “hearsay” 
is any statement that a declarant makes outside of court and 
that is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the 
statement. Statements offered for non-hearsay purposes are not 
hearsay. See Price, 458 F.3d at 211. As the advisory 
committee’s notes to the rule make clear, statements that are 
offered merely to show that they happened are not offered for 
a hearsay purpose. See Fed. R. Evid. 801 note (subdiv. (c)) 
(citing Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 181 F.2d 
70 (7th Cir. 1950), rev’d on other grounds 340 U.S. 558 
(1951)). The recording of the phone call between Nadeau and 
Jasper was not offered to prove the truth of any of Jasper’s 
assertions, but to show that Nadeau had in fact contacted some 
of the victims. So the phone call was not hearsay, and Manzoni 
has failed to show that the District Court abused its discretion 
by allowing it into evidence. 
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B. Manzoni Was Not Prejudiced by the Joinder 
of Her VOG-Fraud and Employment-Fraud 
Charges 
In separate counts, Manzoni was charged with fraud and 
conspiracy for her participation in the VOG scheme, and with 
fraud for allegedly collecting unemployment benefits from the 
State of New Jersey while she was employed at VOG. Manzoni 
moved to sever the charges under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 8. Although the District Court recognized that the 
propriety of joinder here was a close question, it denied her 
motion. Manzoni argues that it was error to join her VOG-fraud 
and unemployment-fraud charges because they lacked a 
sufficient nexus and were not part of the same transaction. The 
appeal of a denial of a motion under Rule 8 is a claim of legal 
error, which we review de novo. United States v. Jimenez, 513 
F.3d 62, 82 (3d Cir. 2008).  
Joinder is controlled by Rule 8. Generally, Rule 8(a) 
addresses joinder of offenses and Rule 8(b) joinder of 
defendants. But Rule 8(a) only applies to prosecutions 
involving a single defendant; “in a multi-defendant case such 
as this, the tests for joinder of counts and defendants is merged 
in Rule 8(b).” United States v. Irizarry, 341 F.3d 273, 287 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). “Although the 
standards of Rule 8(a) and Rule 8(b) are similar, in that they 
both require a transactional nexus between the offenses or 
defendants to be joined, Rule 8(a) is more permissive than Rule 
8(b) because Rule 8(a) allows joinder on an additional ground, 
i.e., when the offenses are of the same or similar character.” Id. 
at 287 n.4 (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also 
Jimenez, 513 F.3d at 82 (“[J]oinder of defendants under Rule 
8(b) is a stricter standard than joinder of counts against a single 
defendant under Rule 8(a).”). For joinder of Manzoni’s cases 
to have been proper under Rule 8(b), they either would have 
had to originate “in the same act or transaction,” or have 
otherwise been integral to one another. See United States v. 
Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 334 (3d Cir. 2010). 
The District Court determined that joinder was proper 
because Manzoni’s employment in the VOG scheme was 
integral to the unemployment-fraud charge: she was charged 
with fraudulently collecting unemployment benefits while she 
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was employed by, and receiving compensation from, VOG. 
But the opposite is not necessarily true. Rather, Manzoni 
suggests, allegations that she illicitly collected unemployment 
benefits would not have been integral to her participation in the 
VOG scheme, so joinder was improper. But even assuming, 
arguendo, that Manzoni is correct, the District Court still did 
not commit reversible error. 
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a), we 
must disregard “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance 
that does not affect substantial rights ….” We have explained 
that “an error involving misjoinder affects substantial rights 
and requires reversal only if the misjoinder results in actual 
prejudice because it had substantial and injurious effect or 
influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Jimenez, 513 F.3d 
at 83 (brackets and internal citations omitted). Here, any 
potential misjoinder would have been harmless because the 
record shows that the joinder did not influence the jury’s 
verdict against Manzoni; after all, she was acquitted of the 
allegedly misjoined charge.  
Because Manzoni’s employment at VOG was integral 
to the unemployment-fraud charges, unfair prejudice in this 
case can only flow in one direction. That is, it would have been 
proper for the jury to conclude that, because Manzoni was 
employed and receiving compensation with the VOG scheme, 
she was committing fraud by receiving unemployment benefits 
from the State of New Jersey. It would have been improper, 
however, for the jury to conclude that, because Manzoni 
committed unemployment fraud, she must also have 
participated in the VOG fraud. But the jury did not reach that 
conclusion; rather, it convicted Manzoni of her role in the VOG 
scheme despite acquitting her of unemployment fraud. So 
joinder of the fraud counts did not affect the jury’s verdict and 
any error in joining the charges was harmless. 
C. Manzoni’s Conviction Was Supported by 
Sufficient Evidence 
Finally, Manzoni challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support her fraud and conspiracy convictions. Our 
standard of review on a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence is plenary. United States v. Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 480 
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(3d Cir. 2010). But that plenary review is greatly tempered by 
giving substantial deference to the jury’s finding of guilt. See 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979). Employing 
that deference, and applying the applicable legal standards, we 
find the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s guilty 
verdict. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has explained:  
[T]he critical inquiry on review of the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal 
conviction must be … to determine whether the 
record evidence could reasonably support a 
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But 
this inquiry does not require a court to ask itself 
whether it believes that the evidence at the trial 
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Instead, the relevant question is whether, after 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). In conducting this review, all reasonable inferences 
must be drawn in favor of sustaining the verdict. United States 
v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1996). Reversal of a 
conviction is only appropriate where there is “no evidence, 
regardless of how it is weighted, from which the jury could find 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Mussare, 
405 F.3d 161, 166 (3d Cir. 2005). 
Manzoni was charged with conspiracy to commit wire 
fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1349 and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1343. To prove wire fraud, the government had to show that 
Manzoni had the intent to commit fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343. 
So the question here is whether Manzoni’s participation in the 
VOG scheme was knowing or intentional. 
Manzoni argues that the evidence presented at trial at 
most showed that she said things as a VOG representative that 
were not true, not that she was a knowing participant in the 
fraud. She claims that this case should be controlled by United 
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States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 542–43 (3d Cir. 1978), in 
which we reversed the fraud convictions of lowly sales 
representatives who only read from a sales script, without 
knowing that the script contained false statements. In light of 
the evidence admitted at trial, we find that Pearlstein does not 
apply. 
First, Manzoni was no lowly sales representative—she 
was one of the managers at VOG. From her position as a 
manager, and her long experience in the timeshare industry, a 
jury could reasonably infer that she knew that statements in 
VOG’s phone scripts were false. Second, even before she was 
a manager, while working as one of VOG’s closers, Manzoni 
did more than just mechanically read false statements from a 
controlled sales script. She showed initiative by inventing fake 
payoff amounts for the customers, without approval—much 
less direction—from her supervisors, and then creating 
urgency by imposing arbitrary deadlines by which these (fake) 
offers had to be accepted before they expired. Based on this 
evidence, as the District Court correctly found, a reasonable 
jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Manzoni 
was “a knowing, even integral part, of [the] fraud scheme.” SA 
1151. 
VI. Conclusion 
For all of the reasons discussed above, we will affirm 
the judgments of conviction and sentences entered against 
Lacerda, Resnick, and Manzoni. 
